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Abstract— Spacecraft are complex systems operating in challenging environments that re-
quire customized testing procedures designed to mitigate the unique hazards of a space 
launch environment. As an example of those testing procedures, we describe the test method-
ology and recommendations developed to mitigate electrostatic discharges that could have 
triggered an explosion of the Space Shuttle during launch, return to launch site, abort after 
one orbit, or during normal landing. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Rocket fueling operations prior to launch, interaction of rocket surfaces with ice clouds 
immediately after launch, contact and separation of the insulating surfaces of gas storage 
tanks aboard spacecraft, and even on orbit operations by astronauts during extra vehicular 
activities all present possibilities for electrostatic hazards. To mitigate these hazards, our 
NASA laboratory at the Kennedy Space Center has performed custom testing in relevant 
environments using actual components and materials for several specific cases. 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20180004235 2019-08-31T15:17:49+00:00Z
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IGNITION FROM ELECTROSTATIC DISCHARGES  
The most important electrostatic hazard for space launch operations is perhaps the pos-
sibility of an ignition due to a discharge. For ignition to occur due to an electrostatic dis-
charge event, the discharge must occur in a flammable atmosphere and the energy of the 
discharge must be greater than the minimum ignition energy of the gas mixture in this 
atmosphere. 
Estimates of the energy associated with a possible spark discharge can be made if the 
voltages necessary to spark are known, as well as the overall capacitance of the system.  
For a simple capacitive system such as a parallel-plate capacitor, the energy released is 
 𝐸 =
1
2
𝐶𝑉2  (1) 
where C is the capacitance and V is the voltage at which it sparked. For a parallel-plate 
capacitor configuration, 
 𝐶 =
𝜀0𝐴
𝑑
 (2) 
where 0 is the permittivity of free space, A is the area, and d is the distance between the 
electrodes. 
POSSIBLE HAZARD DUE TO ELECTROSTATIC DISCHARGES IN THE SPACE SHUTTLE 
NASA document 21492, titled Space Shuttle Program Payload Bay Payload User’s 
Guide [2000], specified that “the major electrostatic discharge (ESD) concern for the 
orbiter is triggering an explosion of hydrogen gas that might inadvertently leak into the 
payload bay during launch, Return to Launch Site, Abort Once Around, or normal land-
ing from residuals in the aft equipment bay plumbing. Hydrogen leakage into an enclo-
sure of air at one atmosphere is typically triggered by an arc of 200 microjoules (J) 
[Lewis and von Elbe, 1987]. An ideal mixture could trigger at 17 J. Stoichiometric mix-
tures of pure hydrogen and pure oxygen could be triggered by an arc of 1.2 J at one at-
mosphere.” 
Although measurements of hydrogen concentrations never exceeded its lower flamma-
bility limit for any of the missions that the Space Shuttle flew, increased hydrogen levels 
above ambient were measured in nearly every launch. Although the Space Shuttle cargo 
bay was purged with nitrogen prior to fueling and remained purged during launch, the 
possibility of a hydrogen ignition due to a spark would increase as oxygen leaks into the 
cargo bay in case of a return to the launch site or of a landing once it completed an orbit. 
These two contingencies never happened, but because they were planned in case of an 
emergency, thorough testing of materials that could generate electrostatic discharges was 
frequently done. In the following sections, we describe the major tests performed and the 
solutions provided. 
ELECTROSTATIC EVALUATION OF THE SPACE SHUTTLE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM 
MULTILAYER INSULATION BLANKETS 
The Space Shuttle had more than 5,000 thermal insulation blankets, composed of sev-
eral layers and were known as Multi-Layer Insulation (MLI) blankets. In general, the 
MLI blankets were of two main types. One type of blanket, Type I, used to shield the 
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payload cargo bay from the Sun, was a 22-layer blanket consisting of a Teflon-coated 
beta cloth layer followed by polyimide film aluminized on one side (Fig. 1). These layers 
were then backed with 19 layers of alternating Dacron mesh or scrim cloth and polyimide 
film aluminized on both sides. The last layer was also a polyimide film aluminized on 
both sides, reinforced with a Nomex scrim cloth laminated on the inside. The aluminized 
covers of these blankets, made by Sheldahl, are complex materials. They are 0.5-mil pol-
yimide film (commonly known as Kapton) that are aluminized on both sides in a high-
speed processing chamber. The aluminum, which is 1000 Å thick, readily oxidizes in air 
and requires an overcoat to protect it from corrosion. The overcoat, made of a transparent 
polymer, is roughly 2000 to 4000 Å thick. This configuration complicates the electrostat-
ic properties of the materials. The covers also contain 13,500 holes per square foot to 
allow the passage of air and are fiber-reinforced with Nomex scrim fabric on one side. 
 
 
Figure 1. Multilayer insulation blanket designs. 
 
The other type of MLI blanket, Type II, used to thermally insulate the Shuttles in orbit, 
was similar to the first one except the beta cloth layer and the polyimide film layer alu-
minized on one side are absent. Instead, the top and bottom of this MLI blanket were 
covered with polyimide film aluminized on both sides with the reinforced layer with the 
laminated Nomex scrim cloth on the inside. 
The aluminized polyimide layers of the beta cloth-covered Type I MLI blankets were 
maintained in electrical contact with each other and with the Shuttle structure. The blan-
kets are joined with staples, studs, and sockets or metal grommets. Blankets are also sewn 
together with polybenzimidazole or Nomex thread. During a thorough inspection of these 
blankets after the Shuttle Columbia disaster, it was discovered that many of these blan-
kets had a relatively high resistance to ground. If this was the case, charge could build up 
in these blankets, creating the possibility of a static discharge. Examination of this issue 
revealed the existence of several possible charging mechanisms not only for this blanket 
but for the aluminized MLI blankets as well. 
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A. Grounding Requirements 
General electrical grounding requirements for the Shuttle TCS blankets state that the 
maximum direct current resistance between a given thermal blanket and the vehicle struc-
ture, bonding strap, wire, or foil strip or between adjacent thermal blankets must be less 
than 1000 Ω, according to Rockwell document MA0113-306 [Crawford and Raval, 1996] 
for Class S bonding or static electricity bonding. NSTS 37330, “Bonding, Electrical and 
Lightning Specifications” [1999], specifies that any isolated conductor must have a re-
sistance to ground of less than 1 Ω. In addition, NSTS 21492 requires no more than 10-Ω 
resistance between blankets and the grounded structure. However, several TCS blanket 
combinations tested did not conform to these requirements, and in several cases the re-
sistance to ground was greater than 1000 Ω [Chambers, 2003]. 
Surface resistance measurements of the aluminized covers of both Type I and Type II 
blankets, which are coated with a 2000 to 4000 Å-thick layer of an electrically insulating 
polymer, were below 20 Ω, well below the 1000 Ω requirement. However, when the 
blankets were connected together, the insulating layer was doubled and the blanket to 
blanket resistance increased to values above the 1000-Ω requirement, reaching several 
hundred kΩ in some cases. These resistances were heavily dependent on the method used 
to connect the blankets. 
Normally a resistance to ground less than 1 MΩ is satisfactory even in the presence of 
hydrogen, which has unusually low minimum ignition energy [Britton, 1999]. Charge 
decay experiments performed in the laboratory on the aluminized covers showed that 
corona charge deposited on these blankets dissipated in less than 2 seconds, indicating 
that the blanket to blanket grounding for these covers was acceptable. Since charge dissi-
pation took place in less than 2 seconds, the aluminized covers of the MLI blankets are 
considered to be statically dissipative (MIL-B-81705C and FTMS 4046). A recommenda-
tion to change the resistance-to-ground requirement from values less than 1000 Ω to less 
than 1 MΩ was made. 
Spacecraft charging standards state that all internal and external metallic layers of MLI 
blankets shall be grounded to structure with at least two bonding straps directly to 
ground, without a daisy chain configuration (ECSS-S-ST-00-01). Table 1 shows the 
bonding configurations used with the Shuttle MLI blankets. Although avoiding a daisy 
chain configuration was not possible for the 5,000 Shuttle blankets, our testing revealed 
that the blanket to blanket connection was acceptable for aluminized covers for all con-
figurations in Table 1, even if only one connection was used instead of the required two. 
However, all configurations except Configuration 2 did a poor job at grounding the inner 
layers of the MLI blankets. Since the inner blankets may not be connected to ground, 
further testing was required. 
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Table 1. TCS Blanket Configurations and Samples for Testing 
Configuration 1 Sample 1 and Sample 2 
Aluminized covers folded and at-
tached with PBI thread with an addi-
tional aluminized tab sewn with PBI 
Configuration 2 
Sample 1.1 and Sample 
2.1 
Folded aluminized covers sewn to-
gether with PBI thread  
Configuration 3 
Sample 3.1 and Sample 
4.1 
Stud and socket (buttons/snaps) 
through folded PBI sewn seam 
Configuration 4 
Sample 5.1 and Sample 
6.1 
Strip of aluminized sewn cover at-
tached by staples 
Configuration 5 
Sample 7.1 and Sample 
8.1 
Same as Configuration 4 except the 
strip is flipped over 
Configuration 6 
Sample 9.1 and Sample 
10.1 
Strip of Beta cloth covered MLI at-
tached by studs and sockets 
 
B. Triboelectric Charging of the MLI Blankets 
To produce a charging scenario that would approach what the MLI blankets might en-
counter during flight, shaker table experiments (Unholtz Dickie Vibrating Test System) 
were performed that simulated the amplitude, the frequency of vibrations, and the chang-
ing accelerations experienced by payloads in the payload bay (Fig. 2). An aluminized 
TCS (no Beta cloth) MLI blanket that measured 41.5 by 36 inches was custom-built to 
represent one of the largest blankets used in the Shuttle payload bay. After cutting one 
side of the blanket to expose the inner layers, resistance measurements between each in-
ner layer and the outer layers were conducted using a PRS-812 meter. The first three in-
ner layers had a resistance between them on the order of a few kilohms, the same as in-
ners layers 4 through 8.  However, inner layers 1 through 3 were not connected to inner 
layers 4 through 8, even though they were stapled together and bound with the Beta glass 
cloth tape. None of the inner layers were connected to the outer layers of the MLI blan-
ket. 
Testing was conducted at room humidity conditions (45% RH) in accordance with 
NASA-STD-7001 [1996] in order to match the Shuttle profile. The power spectral densi-
ty profile in the x-y and z axes is 0.01 g2/Hz at 20 Hz, 20 to 80 Hz on a –3-decibel 
(dB)/oct slope, 0.04 g2/Hz at 80 to 500 Hz, 500 to 2000 Hz on a –3-dB/oct slope, and 
0.01 g2/Hz at 2000 Hz, for a 2-minute duration. Accelerometers monitored the accelera-
tion of the table, and a typical test profile is shown in Fig. 3. 
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Figure 2. Shaker table experiment with aluminized MLI blanket. 
 
Initial tests were performed without wires attached to the blanket to ensure that the sig-
nals generated were in fact triboelectric in nature and not generated by the table noise.  
The ground wires attached to the outer blanket served as shielded cables for the data 
wires connecting different inner layers of the TCS blanket to an ETS nanocoulomb meter 
(Model 230). The nanocoulomb meter was monitored using LabView through a data ac-
quisition board. The results for the amount of charged developed during the shaker table 
test for inner layer 8 are given in Fig. 4. However, since a double-layer was formed due 
to the insulating Dacron mesh attached to the external aluminized layer, charge meas-
urements were expected to be lower than the actual charge developed on the aluminized 
layer. 
ESD event measurements were also performed with the EM Eye device (Fig. 5). Forty-
nine events were recorded during measurements of inner layer 4, and some events were 
relatively large. 
The results of the shaker table experiments above show that it is possible for the MLI 
inner layers to charge simply as a consequence of vibrations during launch. Although the 
overall charging magnitudes were low, incendiary discharges resulting from tribocharged 
inner blanket layers cannot be ruled out based on these magnitudes alone due to the 
aforementioned double layer formation. There are several competing phenomena occur-
ring that may help or hinder the possibility of igniting a flammable gas mixture, such as 
gas pressure, fuel mixture, temperature, quenching distance, and humidity. 
Shaker Table Accelerometer 
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Figure 3. Typical z-axis control used for the Shaker Table experiment. The red lines are the ranges minimum 
and maximum accelerations experienced in the payload bay; the black line is the accelerations experienced 
during the test run as measured by the accelerometer. 
 
C. Electrostatic Hazards 
The next step is to measure or estimate the energy associated with a possible spark dis-
charge. Estimates of the energy can be made if the voltages necessary to spark are 
known, as well as the overall capacitance of the system. For a simple capacitive system 
such as a parallel-plate capacitor, the energy released is given by Eq. (1), Where V is the 
voltage at which it sparked. The TCS blankets conform to this parallel-plate geometry, in 
which the capacitance is C = oA/d, where  o is the permittivity of free space,  A is the 
area of the blanket (approximately 1 m2), and d  is the distance between the inner layer 
and the outer layer (approximately 0.001 m).  The capacitance of the TCS blanket sample 
used in the shaker experiments is 8.85104 pF.  Measurements of the capacitance using a 
Sencore Analyzer gave between 12,000 and 15,000 pF, very close to the estimated value. 
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Figure 4.  Charge measured on the inner layers of the MLI blanket during vertical vibrations in the Shaker 
Table. 
 
 
Figure 5. Electrostatic discharge events monitored with an EM Eye instrument during the vertical shaker table 
experiment. 
 
Electrical breakdown measurements were performed to estimate the maximum allowa-
ble voltage the inner layers could handle before sparking to the outer layers of the TCS 
blankets. A high-voltage power supply (Keithley Model 247) was connected to inner lay-
er 1 of the TCS blanket while the outer layers were electrically grounded. Measurements 
of the output voltage were made in parallel by first reducing the voltage with a Hewlett 
Packard High-Voltage Probe model 3411A and then monitored using a Fluke 87 III True 
RMS Multimeter. The minimum potential at breakdown was approximately 200 V for the 
large TCS blanket used in the shaker table experiments and approximately 300 V for a 
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sample blanket. All voltage breakdowns were associated with sparks between the inner 
layers and the outer cover materials. 
The theoretical energy released in the spark during breakdown of the large TCS blanket 
for  C=14000 pF and V=100 volts is 1.77 mJ or 1770 J. For the sample blanket with a 
measured capacitance of 3400 pF and V=200 volts, the energy released is 0.153 mJ or 
153 J. Such energies are more than sufficient to ignite the most easily ignitable hydro-
gen-oxygen mixture, which has a minimum ignition energy (MIE) of only 17 J in air.  
The shaker table experiments only provided about 4 V maximum between inner and outer 
blanket layers. But this value was likely much lower due to the formation of a double 
layer with the Dacron mesh adhered to the aluminized cover. Other tribocharging mecha-
nisms, such as air blowing through the blankets as it rushes out of the payload bay, may 
lead to higher tribocharging and should not be ruled out. 
For the large aluminized TCS blanket with a capacitance of 8.8510-8 F and MIE for 
the hydrogen-oxygen mixture of 17 J, the minimum ignition voltage is only 19 V. Alt-
hough 19 volts is also far short of the measured breakdown strength of the blanket, 
breakdown voltage is a function of atmospheric pressure. As the Shuttle rises through the 
atmosphere, if the electrostatic potential that has developed between the inner layers and 
the outer layers during launch reaches the electrical breakdown potential of the air, elec-
trical discharges will occur. If at some point during the ascent the breakdown potential 
reaches 19 V, discharges will occur, provided the blankets have acquired sufficient 
charge. But once the pressure is lowered, the minimum ignition energy of a hydrogen-
oxygen mixture rises, raising the minimum voltage necessary for ignition. Figure 6 shows 
how the minimum ignition energy changes as a function of pressure for various hydrogen 
gas mixtures immersed in an oxygen (O2) and nitrogen (N2) environment. The ratio of 
moles of O2 to moles of O2 plus moles of N2 is fixed at 0.21. 
 
 
Figure 6. MIE for various hydrogen gas mixtures as a function of pressure [data from Lewis and von Elbe, 
1987]. 
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Similar relationships hold for the quenching distance. The quenching distance is the 
distance at which no ignitions can occur as the electrodes are moved closer together.  
Experimental quenching distances as a function of pressure for various hydrogen gas 
mixtures are given in Figure 7. 
 
 
Figure 7. Quenching distance for various hydrogen gas mixtures as a function of pressure [data from Lewis and 
von Elbe, 1987]. 
 
If the blanket layers are too close together when they spark, although the spark may 
have sufficient energy to ignite the gas, the separation may be below the quenching dis-
tance and no ignitions will occur. Even though Tuff buttons are used to minimize billow-
ing, it is possible for the MLI blankets to physically separate above the quenching dis-
tances. 
Obtaining an ignition of the flammable gas mixture requires a spark above the mini-
mum ignition energy to occur at separations larger than the minimum quenching distance.  
The preliminary shaker table tests on the MLI blanket were implemented to check the 
possibility of the existence of a charging mechanism. The actual amount of charge devel-
oped on the inner layers of the blankets was most likely underestimated due to double 
layer effects. Since ESD events were recorded during the shaker table experiments, fur-
ther testing and evaluation are required. 
INCENDIVITY TESTING OF THE INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION BLANKETS 
Although additional testing of the Space Shuttle blankets was not performed, similar 
electrostatic evaluation of the International Space Station (ISS) thermal insulation blan-
kets was performed some time later. The ISS MLI blankets are very similar to the Space 
Shuttle MLI blankets. The Space Shuttle TCS blankets are comprised of both multi-layer 
(MLI) blankets and fibrous blankets while the ISS thermal control system blankets are 
comprised of MLI blankets and thermal shrouds. The STS MLI and fibrous blankets have 
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both reinforced aluminum covers and PTFE-coated fiberglass covers while the ISS MLI 
blankets only have PTFE covers. The Shuttle’s PTFE-coated fiberglass (or Beta cloth) 
covered MLI and fibrous blankets contain a graphite or stainless steel wire grid sewn 
within it for electrical grounding purposes. However, the ISS PTFE-coated covers do not 
contain a wire grid sewn within the material but instead one side of the covers is alumi-
num coated to enhance thermal properties. 
To evaluate any possible ignition hazard associated with the ISS blankets in the cargo 
bay, the blankets were placed in an environment that represented a leak of hydrogen in 
the aft and/or cargo bay of the orbiter (NASA NSTS 21492). If the blankets were unable 
to create a spark of high enough energy to ignite a hazardous gas mixture, then the ISS 
blankets would be deemed safe in their current configuration. To achieve this environ-
ment, an incendivity vacuum chamber was designed and built. This large vacuum cham-
ber (Figure 8) was used to create flammable environments at both ambient and reduced 
pressures. 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Incendivity vacuum chamber with shaker head and accelerometer. 
 
The ISS MLI blankets were shaken in the incendivity vacuum chamber using the Shut-
tle vibration profile (Fig. 3). A hydrogen-enriched atmosphere was introduced into the 
chamber. A full description of this test will be given in a subsequent paper.  
 
 
 
Shaker Head 
Accelerometer 
 
Counterweights 
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The incendivity chamber testing showed that sparking events were never of sufficient 
energy to ignite a hydrogen-enriched atmosphere even at stoichiometric ratios. Any 
sparks that occurred between the ungrounded aluminized layer of the betacloth and the 
Dacron scrim cloth in the case of the MLI blankets, or the sparks that occurred between 
the betacloth and the anodized plate in the case of the thermal shrouds, must have had 
energies lower than the MIE of the hydrogen-air mixture. Of the 432 tests performed on 
the ISS blankets and shrouds, 192 (or 44%) were performed in environments that had 
MIEs equal to or lower than 25 J. The actual number of discharges per test is not 
known, but according to Table 10 it is very likely that there were several discharges in 
each test performed, including the 192 tests with the very low MIEs. Therefore, all of the 
discharges that occurred in these tests must have had energies lower than 25 J. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Rocket fueling operations prior to a launch, contact and separation of the insulating 
surfaces aboard spacecraft, and even on-orbit operations by astronauts during extra ve-
hicular activities present possibilities for electrostatic hazards. Our NASA laboratory at 
the Kennedy Space Center performs custom electrostatic testing in relevant environments 
using actual components and materials. We have described the extensive testing of com-
plex multilayer insulation blankets the were used aboard the Space Shuttle and that are 
currently used on the International Space Station. These tests require the implementation 
of electrostatic testing standards to suit relevant environments, such as the vacuum of 
space or the rapidly atmospheric pressure decrease during a rocket launch. Subsequent 
papers will describe in more detail the indenditivity testing performed on the ISS MLI 
blankets, as well as specialized testing performed on several NASA rockets. 
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